ARTICLES
Cyclical Behavior and Ideological Change in American Politics
Daniel Barclay
(Pages 4-38)

Interpreting Friendship:
The U.S. Supreme Court’s relationship with its amici curiae as a lens to the Court’s interpretive approach
Leah H. Silver
(Pages 39-78)

BOOK REVIEWS
Square Peg: Confessions of a Citizen Senator
Orrin Hatch
(Pages 79-80)

Silent Voices: Public Opinion and Political Participation in America
Adam J. Berinksy
(Pages 81-83)
The Michigan Journal of Political Science

Undergraduates at the University of Michigan publish the Michigan Journal of Political Science biannually. The Journal was founded to create a forum for undergraduate and graduate students to publish superior undergraduate papers. In addition, we hope to provide our staff with experience in academic journalism and to encourage research and scholarly writing on contemporary topics in political science and other related fields.

The editorial staff will publish submissions of any methodology or viewpoint, and welcome articles on political topics from non-students and students from other disciplines. The editorial board selects and edits all published articles, though authors remain solely responsible for the accuracy of the facts they present. The opinions in an article do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial board. The editorial board automatically considers submission from University of Michigan undergraduates for the Frank Grace award, a cash prize for the best-submitted paper each year. Decisions are made in the spring by the Senior Editors. The Journal is also published online at http://www.umich.edu/~mjps/archives.html. Articles appearing in the Michigan Journal of Political Science are annotated and indexed in Historical Abstracts, America: History and Life, and International Political Science Abstracts.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

The Journal’s subscription rate is fifteen dollars for two issues, and twenty dollars for issues worldwide. Back issues can be purchased for eight dollars each. Subscriptions should be sent to the Subscriptions Editor at the address below or obtained via the web at www.mjps.org. Please see the subscription form in the back of the Journal for more information.

SUBMISSION OF MANUSCRIPT

Articles should be submitted to the Submissions Editor, Michigan Journal of Political Science 5700 Haven Hall, 505 South State Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1045, or on our website at www.mjps.org. All articles must contain a separate sheet listing the author’s name, current address, telephone number, email address, biographical information, and an abstract no longer than 150 words. Unless submitted online, one copy of the article should be submitted in addition on a 3.5-inch computer disk with the article in Microsoft Word format. Request for further information can be sent via email to mjps@umich.edu.

Copyright © 2005: Michigan Journal of Political Science (ISSN 0773-4487) 5639 Haven Hall, The University of Michigan, Department of Political Science, Ann Arbor, MI 48109.

Editor-in-Chief:

Lindsay Klee

Editor-in-Chief (abroad):

Mary Beers

Senior Editors:

John Gehart
Ross Jensen
Jessica Ketten
Soumya Rangarajan
Markus Sztejnberg

Associate Editors:

Kelly Cobb
Erin Ehrlich
Matthew Forgotson
Ashley Jardina
Ari Kushner
Leni Morrison
Karen Patros
Amanda Plisner
Lisa Vandercruyssen
Stephanie Wang
EDITOR'S NOTE

This issue of the Michigan Journal of Political Science is, as has long been tradition, the result of a substantial collaboration between our dedicated editorial staff and many individuals affiliated with the University’s Department of Political Science. In particular, Lili Kivisto has extended her enthusiasm and experience our way. Without the heartfelt support of Lili, Professor Donald Kinder, the continued support from the Frank Grace family, and so many others— we would not be the publication we are today.

A staff of seventeen undergraduate editors, The Michigan Journal of Political Science has grown considerably in the past two years. In addition to increasing our staff size, we have expanded our organizational and publishing capabilities, restructured our editing processes, and are gradually increasing our subscriber-base throughout the world. In this issue, we have assembled two pieces of original research and two staff-written book reviews.

Daniel Barclay’s article, “Cyclical Behavior and Ideological Change in American Politics” examines what has been described as cyclical fluctuations between conservative and countervailing liberal tendencies in politics. In “Interpreting Friendship: The U.S. Supreme Court’s relationship with its amici curiae as a lens to the Court’s interpretive approach,” Leah H. Silver presents her original research on aspects of both the historical and current uses of amicus briefs.

Working as an editor with the Michigan Journal of Political Science has been an honor. I proudly present to you: Volume II: Issue 3.

Lindsay E. Klee
Editor-in-Chief
CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR AND IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS

Daniel Barclay
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Past efforts at discerning cyclical behavior in American politics have largely ended in failure due to their non-rigorous nature. This paper attempts a novel approach by constructing differential equations in which the more a particular ideology dominates, the greater are the countervailing pressures towards its opposing ideology. The resulting functions account for ideological change in a cyclical manner, while through a diminishing amplitude and frequency fulfilling the criteria of irregularity laid out by Stimson (1991) and others.

This model is able to explain findings of an increasingly liberal public mood since 1980 while preserving the possibility of a concurrent conservative realignment. By assuming that the mood change reflects a greater trust in government competence consistent with cyclical predictions, a post-1980 decline in demand for public services becomes not only plausible but also likely. Statistical and microeconomic analyses confirm this expectation.

A forward extrapolation indicates that any conservative realignment may have already peaked, implying the probable commencement of a less extensive liberal realignment within fifteen years. With reduced confidence, the model also projects a subsequent conservative realignment of still lesser magnitude originating in about 2057.

Too often political analysis is obscured by minutiae, particularly the many extensive electoral studies that grow more methodologically complex by the day. This state of affairs serves a valuable function in enhancing rigor, but it nevertheless remains wise to step back at times for the examination of overarching trends. Such broad assessments within the electoral politics literature have mainly been conducted through the study of “realignments,” or supposed sea changes in American politics that recur in regular intervals. But such studies have suffered from the opposite problem as the traditional literature – namely, that they have proven themselves to be largely speculative, non-rigorous, and therefore wrong.

The first attempt at uncovering cyclical patterns in American politics was undertaken by renowned historian Henry Adams (1918). Adams postulated a “pendulum” model with a period of twelve years in which American politics
alternated between periods of diffuse and centralized power. As evidence, Adams noted the largely diffuse government from 1776 to 1788, during the Second Continental Congress and Articles of Confederation (Wood 151), the largely centralized government from 1788 to 1800, during Federalist and Hamiltonian dominance, and a return to diffuse government upon the rise of Jeffersonian Republicanism (Adams and Harbert 246). After 1812, however, this explanation of events broke down (Johnson 257-266).

Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. (1949) made the next serious attempt, redefining the “diffuse” and “centralized” cycles respectively into “liberal” periods of collective action to improve the political, economic, and social status quo, and countervailing “conservative” periods of the defense of the status quo. Schlesinger, Sr. generally agreed with Adams’ three cycles and continued them as follows: a conservative cycle from 1812-1829, a liberal cycle from 1829-1841, a conservative cycle from 1841-1861, a liberal cycle from 1861-1869, a conservative cycle from 1869-1901, a liberal cycle from 1901-1919, a conservative cycle from 1919-1931, and a liberal cycle from 1931 to 1947, the year of authorship. On the basis of a calculated mean cyclical length of 16.55 years, this model foresaw a conservative cycle from 1947-1962, a liberal cycle from 1962-1978, and a conservative cycle from 1978-1993, a projection that upon casual inspection seems to have been fairly accurate.

Despite these findings, the electoral cycles literature made little headway. A multitude of studies (Key 1955; Schattschneider 1956; Burnham 1967; Sundquist 1973) attempted to demonstrate the existence of so-called “critical elections” or “realignment” periods, which would confirm the existence of these cycles by delineating their transitions. Representative of these studies is Burnham (1970, 136), who argued that political tension rises throughout each cycle, culminating in “flash points” involving an abrupt change in political ideology. These efforts themselves perhaps culminated in the work of historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (1986). He proposed a regime of alternating cycles of the “public purpose” (liberal) and the “private interest” (conservative) due to cumulative public disappointment with the status quo and similar factors, including a prediction of liberal dominance for the sixteen years commencing in 1992 (Schlesinger, Jr. 1992).

Theory
Assumptions of the characteristics of relevant cyclical behavior are as follows.

Existence. There is long-term cyclical behavior in American politics, and by extension the politics of all two-party democratic industrialized states. This implies that there are intermittent periods of time, or “cycles,” during which a particular political ideology is dominant, and only moderate members of the opposition party may assume power. A crucial distinction separates the absolute value of ideological dominance from the derivative or change towards that ideology. For example, although the year 1933 saw perhaps the greatest shift towards liberalism, the country was more liberal in absolute terms a few years or even a few decades later, once the changes had taken effect.

Duration. These cycles are not necessarily regular in frequency. No shortage of exogenous short-term fluctuations exists to affect the duration of each cycle at the margins. Also, there are brief yet ambiguous transitions between cycles that are difficult to categorize – the year 1932, for example. Mayhew demonstrates that attempting to boil everything down into immutable 36- or $n$-year cycles is chimerical. In fact, one would not intuitively expect the frequencies to be constant, but rather to diminish with each successive cycle, for as political institutions mature they also stabilize.

Intensity. These cycles are not necessarily regular in amplitude. The amplitude diminishes with time, with each succeeding cycle less intense than its precursor. Reasons for this phenomenon include the gradual maturation of political institutions towards a steady state, as well as the fact that social scientific advances and past experimentation lead a political system to gradually approach an “optimal” bundle of public policies.

Modeling this system is straightforward. We may construct a differential equation in which the more a particular ideology dominates, the greater are the countervailing pressures towards the opposing ideology.\(^2\) Letting the political ideology function be represented by $F(t)$, with positive values arbitrarily denoting a “liberal” ideology and negative values representing conservatism,\(^3\) we therefore realize that:

\(^2\) As noted above, this observation is well documented by Burnham (1970) and Schlesinger Jr. (1987), as well as numerous other contemporaneous studies. The underlying reasons may include executive overreach or complacency, growing public disillusionment at the ideology’s inevitable failures, and an implicit recognition by the electorate that regular ideological change is vital to the maintenance of a healthy democracy.

\(^3\) The author fervently hopes that this designation will not expose him to indignant accusations of bias. One definition of political ideology is “those explicit systems of general beliefs that give large bodies of people a common identity and purpose, a common program of action” (Higham 1974, 10).
\[ F(t) \propto -\frac{dF(t)}{dt} \] (1)
such that political ideology is inversely proportional to its rate of change. Less intuitive is the likewise negative relationship between \( F(t) \) and its second derivative. While \( \frac{dF(t)}{dt} \) represents the change in political ideology, \( \frac{d^2F(t)}{dt^2} \) denotes the change in \( \frac{dF(t)}{dt} \). One would expect a dominant ideology to attract not only a backlash, but also a growing backlash.

\[ F(t) \propto -\frac{d^2 F(t)}{dt^2} \] (2)

Combining equations (1) and (2) results in a homogenous second-order differential equation.

\[ \frac{d^2 F(t)}{dt^2} + c_1 \frac{dF(t)}{dt} + c_2 F(t) = 0 \] (3)

where \( c_1 \) and \( c_2 \) are coefficients that account for the proportionality of the relationships of (1) and (2). The resemblance to a harmonic oscillator is striking. Our prior observation that both the oscillator’s frequency and amplitude diminish with time allows us to declare it of the under damped variety, implying that \( \frac{c_1}{2} < \sqrt{c_2} \) and leading to a solution of the form:

\[ F(t) = e^{-at} \sin(bt^\lambda) \] (4)

where \( a > 0 \) and \( \lambda > 1 \) to ensure that both frequency and amplitude monotonically decrease. It then follows to perform a regression analysis of \( F(t) \) on representative composite variables denoting the “supply” of a positive ideology \( Q_s \).

\[ F(t) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 Q_s + \beta_3 Q_s^2 + \varepsilon \] (5)

---

\( ^4 \) In a physical system, \( c_1 \) could represent the oscillator’s drag coefficient and \( c_2 \) the square of its natural frequency. Any constant \( c_3 \) as the coefficient of the \( \frac{d^2F(t)}{dt^2} \) term could be readily eliminated by multiplying each term by that coefficient’s reciprocal. There is no driving function on the right-hand side of the equation since the influence of exogenous fluctuations (or, if one prefers, the hand of God) cannot be systematically quantified.
A corresponding regression may be performed for the “demand” $Q_d$, related to trends in public opinion akin to the index developed by Stimson (1991).

\[ F(t) = \beta_4 + \beta_5 Q_d + \beta_6 Q_d^2 + \varepsilon \]  

(6)

Within this framework, ideology $F(t)$ represents not the extent to which the state supplies or the public demands government services, but rather the “price” of those services. Such a model corresponds with intuition, for economies of scale dictate that attempts to increase provision of government services will increase their marginal cost, resulting in a less efficient allocation of tax revenues that could only serve to reduce public demand for them. The result is a negative feedback mechanism, which strongly implies the existence of cyclical behavior. Combining equations (4) through (6) produces a complete system.

\[ \beta_1 + \beta_2 Q_s + \beta_3 Q_s^2 \approx e^{-at} \sin(bt^2) \approx \beta_4 + \beta_5 Q_d + \beta_6 Q_d^2 \]  

(7)

Determining the values of these constants will require a thorough examination of the evidence.

**Evidence**

Disregarding the early years of the republic, there were probably two electoral cycles prior to the modern era – a more “diffuse” or “liberal” cycle from 1801 to 1860 and a more “centralized” or “conservative” cycle from 1861 to 1931. Given the absence of mass politics during these cycles, as well as the inherent unwieldiness of comparing more than two objectives simultaneously, the emphasis will remain on the widely acknowledged liberal cycle from approximately 1932 to 1980, and the conservative cycle since that time.$^5$

During these cycles, every executive government$^6$ has been either a practitioner of the dominant school of thought or a member of the moderate

---

$^5$ Two immediate potential flaws come to mind. Contrary to our earlier assumptions, frequency did not diminish from the first to the second cycle – pre-1932 data will not be accounted for due to its marginal relevance. Furthermore, Mayhew considers the 1980 elections to only “[p]ossibly” or “arguably” qualify as significant (2000, 465), a view shared by Schlesinger, Jr. (1992), who viewed them as a mere hallmark of short-lived conservative reaction. Here we part ways. Prior to 1980 “default” public policies were liberal, while now they are conservative. That a “certifiable realignment has occurred since 1932” (Mayhew 2000, 457) is established in depth later on.

$^6$ To avoid confusion, the term “government” in this and related contexts refers to an extended period of time during which modes of executive governance remain fairly constant. The Nixon and Ford administrations, for example, would jointly be considered a single government. Both terms are used interchangeably.
opposition. To elaborate, each cycle has been characterized by an initial outburst of the dominant ideology (in liberalism’s case, 1933-1941; in conservatism’s case, 1981-1989), a successor also belonging to the dominant ideology but more moderate by nature (in liberalism’s case, 1945-1952; in conservatism’s case, 1989-1993), a successor belonging to the moderate opposition\(^7\) (in liberalism’s case, 1953-1961; in conservatism’s case, 1993-2001; and a successor belonging to the dominant ideology (in liberalism’s case, 1961-1969; in conservatism’s case, 2001-2009). “Ideological governments” have sought to alter the preferences of the electorate (i.e., \( \frac{dF(t)}{dt} > 0 \) during the liberal cycle and \( \frac{dF(t)}{dt} < 0 \) during the conservative cycle); while “moderate governments”, whether of the dominant or opposition party, have attempted very little such change (i.e., \( \frac{dF(t)}{dt} \approx 0 \)).

In other branches of government, the legislature has remained solidly in the hands of the dominant ideology throughout the bulk of each cycle, acting as a natural impetus towards ideological change. Due to the lag in judicial retirements, the courts remain in the hands of the previous cycle’s ideology during the initial portion of each cycle (Gates 1992), hindering ideological change; yet the courts have gradually succumb via new appointments to the dominant ideology, such that by the time of the second ideological government they contribute to that era’s drive towards change. The media would tend to follow suit near the midpoint of each cycle.

The historical record supports this qualitative framework.

First ideological government

The first leader of any ideological movement will naturally be its strongest. Preceded by a long stretch of weak governance and economic malaise deriving from the inevitable overreach and failings of the preceding cycle, the electorates of 1932 and 1980 were most willing to countenance radical change. That change manifests itself through bold new initiatives seeking to entrench the newly dominant ideology into public policy (Kennedy 245; Woodworth and Land 77-80).

Since no economic downturn lasts forever, these leaders take the credit for the inevitable recovery. These improvements in the economy seem to indicate that the bold new policy initiatives – whether they be increasing social spending, in the case of liberalism (Kennedy 152), or cutting taxes, in the case of conservatism (Griffith and Baker 454-456) – are working, lending additional

\(^7\) A moderate opposition does not seek to overturn the fundamental reforms undertaken by its ideological predecessor, and indeed implicitly confirms those reforms by declining to act against them.
support to the administration that translates into a mandate for continued change. Once further progress on the home front becomes difficult (as ideas and the opposition adapts\(^8\)), change can carry over into the realm of foreign affairs. While the previous malaise had almost necessitated a relatively low international profile, the revival enables America to assert itself more forcefully on the world stage (Kennedy 466; Griffith and Baker 499-502), including finally mustering the strength to confront long-festering problems of anti-democratic movements abroad. While costly, the invigorated political situation ensures that these initiatives, as with their domestic counterparts, will prove successful (Kennedy 798-851, 919-926; Gaddis 514-518).

The ultimate effect of this administration on the country is to both strengthen it and to shift the terms of its public discourse decidedly in favor of its ideal political ideology (Johnson 763-767). While opponents resent its success in the latter regard, they also respect it in the former. The administration becomes in a sense legendary, an impression that only grows with the passage of time. Its \(\frac{dF(t)}{dt}\) value is extreme. The value of \(F(t)\) during this period is smaller, for the ideological changes require time to take effect.

**Moderate ideological government**

Its now-crippled opposition could hardly immediately follow such a powerful government. Rather, it turns over the reins of power to a successor administration of the same party, bequeathing to it good economic times, a strong executive branch, and a record of success. The cycle’s second administration is then placed in the distinctly unenviable position of having to extend a record it cannot possibly live up to.

Since most substantive ideas for domestic initiatives were already enacted under its predecessor, in that respect the administration has a tendency to adopt style over substance,\(^9\) in favor of a focus on foreign affairs involving the finding of a long-term national role in the newly transformed international system (Griffith and Baker 86-87, 512-513). Undermining its efforts is economic recession, the short-term price of the major stimulatory actions of the past (Woodworth and Land 24-27). These challenges prove too daunting to

---

\(^8\) In the misguided hope that the ideological shift is short-lived, the opposition leaders cling to their old ways far longer than is in their best interests, ensuring that they are locked out of power by wide margins.

\(^9\) President Truman, for example, levied a charge that the opposition’s agenda “sticks a knife into the back of the poor” (Truman 1948) along with other fiery rhetoric during his campaign, while President George H.W. Bush took symbolic stands against “un-American” practices such as flag burning, although the two leaders’ agendas while in office were more moderate than these deportments would suggest.
accomplish alone. Accordingly, the administration must moderate its ideological agenda in hopes of attracting greater support from the electorate and the opposition (Wolfe 16-25; Griffith and Baker 457-458; Woodworth and Land 87-90). The opposition, having learned through the repeated defeats of its unreconstructed wing at the hands of the new guard that its traditional agenda is a relic of the past, has likewise moved to the center. As a result, partisan acrimony decreases to a relative minimum and the administration’s bid succeeds – but at the cost of implicitly legitimizing the opposition.

Thus, after a long stretch of dominance by one party, the electorate is more than willing to turn to the other as soon as it has become a credible alternative. The cycle’s second administration meets with an early demise, having failed to effect much ideological change in either direction. The quantity $\frac{dF(t)}{dt}$ is still nonzero, however, out of the previous government’s momentum – so paradoxically, $F(t)$ itself continues to move in the direction of the dominant ideology.

First moderate opposition government

The cycle’s third government - of the opposing party to the dominant ideology - has already demonstrated its lack of hostility towards that ideology through its ability to assume power despite unsympathetic public opinion. As such, it makes no serious attempt to dismantle the first administration’s achievements, nor could it succeed if it tried (Woodworth and Land 30-32, 109-113).11 Since it is not of the mind to extend upon those achievements, and indeed “tend[s] to be suspicious of ideology in general” (Miles 2001, 13), as with its predecessor, this government will not preside over a significant change in political ideology and in essence is simply marking time.

The initial economic fallout from the first government’s reforms, which cost the second government its job, has now come to an end, paving the way for a prolonged period of economic growth. With foreign affairs also under control

---

10 The Truman administration was effectively prevented from re-election in 1952 due to low public approval (Schlesinger, Jr. 1971). Both it and its counterpart, however, gained greater respect from the opposing party in hindsight.

11 The Eisenhower administration did not try; any “grass-roots rebellion against liberalism” during the 1950s merely halted ideological change, not reverse its direction (Sugrue 1995, 552). The Bill Clinton administration did make an initial attempt through “compromise after compromise with the ‘Old’ wing of the party in Congress” (Miles 2001, 15), but could not succeed, with the same net result. This difference arises from the earlier observation that the conservative cycle was less extreme than its liberal predecessor, for the simple reason that it had a predecessor, which retained a proportion of its influence.
thanks to the solid managerial efforts of its predecessor, the third government can put its figurative feet up and take credit for the booming economy (Johnson 826-838). With the legislature solidly in the opposition’s hands, there is little the third government could do. It does sign off on some of the opposition’s better ideas (for example, the 1957 civil rights and 1996 welfare reform acts) while checking any further impulses to move in a more ideological direction (Griffith and Baker 461). Due to the administration’s moderate orientation, personal popularity, and accompanying strong economy, it is favorably viewed as more in touch with the common citizen than the stiffly ideological opposition, and handily re-elected. Nevertheless, on a certain level this administration’s lack of accomplishment and purpose haunts it, and the image of the cycle’s third government improves little in hindsight.

Second ideological government

After nearly a decade of opposition rule, and over a decade of moderate governance, the electorate grows weary of a persistent lack of inspiration and again seeks strong leadership. Although the prosperous status quo is tempting – and the ideological candidacy must run a moderate campaign to avoid giving the unwanted impression of radical change13 - in the end the dominant ideology is narrowly returned to office.

At first, the fourth government’s mission of ideological change seems to get off to a rocky start. The fickle economic cycle, so cooperative during the prior government, briefly lapses into recession; and the ensuing shaky public support blocks much progress after the first year despite a friendly Congress. As with the second government, a weak economy forces this administration to moderate its politics and attempt to compensate via an invigorated foreign policy, a compensation that initially proves successful. Rhetoric and imagery aside, these initial periods are in fact counter-ideological – witness the 1963 tax cut and a 25% rise in government outlays from fiscal years 2001 to 2004 (Council of Economic Advisers 2004, 377).

12 To be fair, they do contribute to the prosperity through sound economic policies – respectively, high interest rates to limit inflationary pressures from postwar growth, and spending restraint to avoid excessive fiscal stimulus.

13 The victorious 1960 and 2000 campaigns were among the most moderate in memory. The Democratic platform pledged to “unshackle American enterprise and to free American labor, industrial leadership, and capital, to create an abundance that will outstrip any other system” (Schlesinger Jr. 1971, 2938), while the Republican convention was “tightly controlled… in an effort to win the votes of young people, moderates, and women” (Kerbel 2002, 196).
Economic recovery arrives in time for a resounding re-election victory (the opposition, stung by its narrow defeat, has reverted back to its old immoderate ways), providing a new burst of momentum to the government’s ideological agenda (Johnson 869-876; Griffith and Baker 224-225). The administration’s desire to replicate the success of the first ideological government leads it to replicate many of its policies, both domestic and foreign. Yet having already been enacted once, their marginal benefits are lower and their marginal costs higher. Accordingly, while the government’s second term is very prosperous,14 of which the public approves (Woodworth and Land 41-46), that approval is qualified, especially by uncertainty over its foreign agenda.15

In the end, the cycle’s fourth government proves to be its most ideological – $F(t)$ is at its extrema. However, attempts to bolster $F(t)$ came at the cost of a considerable degree of polarization (Stonecash et al. 2002), engendering a neutralizing backlash that leaves $\frac{dF(t)}{dt}$ close to zero or even reversed in direction despite the government’s intentions. This backlash persists, constituting the mechanism by which $F(t)$ will gradually revert back to its old equilibrium.

**Second moderate opposition government**

Weary of the stresses brought about by ideological change, the earlier period of laid-back moderate governance begins to seem more attractive in the eyes of the public. Having recovered from its bout with “extremism” (Goldwater 1964), the opposition readopts its moderate face to narrowly assume power (Johnson 887-890).

Since the dominant ideology is near its apex, and by now enjoys firm control of both the legislature and judiciary, this government is forced to practice moderation in word as well as deed.16 This concordance with public

---

14 The 1960s have been referred to as a “golden age” of prosperity (Kindleberger 1992, 16). Data from 2005 to 2009 is presently unavailable, although the Congressional Budget Office forecasts a solid 3.0% annual growth in real GDP over that time period (CBO 2004). The author believes this projection to be if anything overly pessimistic, compensating for the excessive optimism of the CBO’s 2010-2014 forecast.

15 The government’s attempts at emulation of the first ideological government’s foreign policies involve a more forceful role in the international system. As with its domestic program, this engenders a degree of backlash. It is not the author’s intention to equate the Vietnam and Iraq conflicts.

16 Behind the scenes is a different matter – the administration acts as counter-ideologically as it can get away with while not jeopardizing the trust of the public and hence its own re-election (Greenberg 2001).
opinion leads to a solid re-election victory, even though the economy has taken a
turn for the worse due to the fiscal irresponsibility of its ideological predecessor.
However, an inability to enact any major initiatives aside from those favored by
the dominant ideology (Woodworth and Land 57-58), coupled with the faltering
economy, leads the government to look to foreign policy for its achievements –
its diplomatic skills ensure that damage to the national interest from an
inevitably lower international profile is kept to a minimum (Litvak et al. 1986).

Still, as the economy stubbornly refuses to recover, the government’s
popularity slowly declines, along with the public’s faith in the dominant
ideology to enact successful social policy. The cycle’s fifth government meets
with a lackluster end, having presided for the first time over a backsliding in
ideology – $\frac{dF(t)}{dt} < 0$ for the liberal cycle and $\frac{dF(t)}{dt} > 0$ for the conservative
cycle.

**Third ideological government**

Amidst a struggling economy and diminished international influence,
there are widespread hopes that a new administration of the dominant ideology
will be able to place the country back on track. But bereft of ideas, it proves
impotent to correct the situation. The administration would certainly like to
effect further change, and has the legislature and judiciary on its side, but
belongs to an ideology that has simply “run out of steam” (Calvert 1988, 131).
The administration is instead caught in a downward spiral of low economic
performance leading to low popularity, leading to an enfeebled government,
leading to poor domestic and foreign policy.

In the face of mounting evidence that it has lost the support of the
public, out of desperation the administration turns to positions favored by
the opposing ideology (Biven 2002, 253), which after decades in the political
wilderness has amassed plenty of fresh ideas. But why choose the watered-
down version when one can have the real thing? The dominant ideology is
decisively ousted in the next election through a strongly negative $\frac{dF(t)}{dt}$ value,
paving the way for a new cycle to begin.
The record thus far is summarized in Table 1.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle</th>
<th>Government type</th>
<th>Interval</th>
<th>$F(t)$</th>
<th>$\frac{dF(t)}{dt}$</th>
<th>$\frac{d^2F(t)}{dt^2}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>First ideological</td>
<td>1932-1945</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++++</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Moderate ideological</td>
<td>1945-1953</td>
<td>++++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Moderate opposition</td>
<td>1953-1961</td>
<td>++++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Second ideological</td>
<td>1961-1969</td>
<td>++++</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Second moderate opposition</td>
<td>1969-1977</td>
<td>++++</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Third ideological</td>
<td>1977-1980</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>First ideological</td>
<td>1980-1989</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Moderate ideological</td>
<td>1989-1993</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Moderate opposition</td>
<td>1993-2001</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Second ideological</td>
<td>2001-2009</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have seen that both the broad contours and internal mechanisms of each cycle are consistent. Still, these are expansive claims and require quantitative data for support. Data on the change in non-defense federal employees, the change in non-defense government spending, and the number of issued executive orders clearly establish the demarcation between the liberal and conservative cycles. Even during periods of opposition rule, these basic structural indicators of governmental involvement in the economy did not noticeably change (Higgs 1987).

The extent of liberal ideological dominance is related to the extent of governmental involvement in the economy, which in turn is related to the size of government, as measured by its personnel. Setting aside military and homeland security employees, whose hiring patterns are particularly sensitive to exogenous events, gives the data shown in Figure 1(a).
Reliable data is only available for the years following 1940 (Office of Management and Budget 2004), and even then is initially subjected to large fluctuations attendant to demobilization and the Korean War. Since positive population growth would suggest a positive growth in federal employees as a natural state of affairs, data shall only be considered since that growth rate became consistent in 1955.

Said average growth rate shows a general decline since the late 1950s and a marked drop in the early 1980s. Experimenting with various cutoff years yields a clearest distinction at 1979; before then, the annual growth in federal employees averaged 2.6%, while afterwards it has been -0.4%. This represents a seismic shift in the scope of government - although in keeping with earlier observations, the later cycle has the smaller magnitude.

The effects of political ideology may also be felt in non-defense government spending (Kurian 1998, 82), shown in Figure 1(b) (OMB 2004). As before, defense-related outlays are excluded. Once more a pronounced decline is evident during the early 1980s. Experimenting with various cutoff years gives a clearest distinction at 1982 (the later cutoff year matches intuition – fiscal policy takes longer to change than simply firing people); from 1955 until that year, the annual growth in government expenditures averaged 11.7%, while since then it has been only 6.1%.

A final measure of political ideology is the number of annual executive orders issued (Figure 1(c); U.S. National Archives 2004). A liberal ideology, involving a more active role for government, could be expected to attempt management of a wider array of policies than its conservative counterpart.

An early 1980s drop is again evident. To be sure, much of the decline is simply due to the executive order falling into disfavor (Krause and Cohen 2000, 96) – but could this not imply the notion of an active government falling into disfavor? Experimenting with various cutoff years yields a clearest distinction at 1983 (again, the cutoff year matches intuition – the first few years of conservative ideological dominance would see many executive orders designed to roll back prior initiatives, after which the number would fall off); from 1933 to that year, the annual number of executive orders averaged 131, while since then it has been a mere 43. Even excluding the early data by adopting our favored 1955 starting point leaves the liberal cycle’s average at 65, a full 50% higher than its conservative equivalent.

These data have identified dependent variables that demarcate the liberal and conservative cycles, which will prove quite helpful in further analysis.
The Theory Revisited

These findings enable us to clarify equation (4). The completed differential equation can now be solved for $F(t)$, yielding $a \approx -0.0168$, $b \approx 0.0363$, and $\lambda \approx 1.150$.

$$F(t) \approx e^{-0.0168t} \sin(0.0363t^{1.15}) \quad (8)$$

where $t$ represents the number of years since 1932. Graphing $F(t)$ yields Figure 2(a).

The graph of Figure 2(a) corresponds with intuition. Liberal ideology steadily increases throughout the New Deal period, then increases at a slower rate as the changes become entrenched. $F(t)$ attains a relative maximum about halfway through the cycle – then, the second ideological government attempts to push it even higher, provoking a public backlash that begins to diminish $F(t)$. By the late 1970s, ideological stagnation has forced the dominant mode of governance into moderation, which in turn gives rise to a new cycle that continues the decline of $F(t)$ into negative territory. The downward trend is steepest during this cycle’s first ideological government and continues until the late 1990s as the reforms are solidified, reaching a relative minimum for $F(t)$. A second ideological government then seeks to resume the decline, upon which we arrive at the present.

Figure 2(a) is far from perfect. $F(t)$ did not monotonically decrease throughout the entire period 1960-1990, for example; the year 1964 surely saw a sizeable increase. Accounting for such discontinuities, however, would render this relation so specific as to eliminate its ability to encompass the overarching trends.

Also of note is the change in ideology $\frac{dF(t)}{dt}$, and the rate of said change $\frac{d^2F(t)}{dt^2}$. Differentiating equation (8) gives:

$$\frac{dF(t)}{dt} \approx e^{-0.0168t} [0.0417t^{1.15} \cos(0.0363t^{1.15}) - 0.0168 \sin(0.0363t^{1.15})] \quad (9)$$

$$\frac{d^2F(t)}{dt^2} \approx t^{-0.0168} [0.0063 - 0.0014t \cos(0.0363t^{1.15}) + 0.0003t^{1.15} \sin(0.0363t^{1.15})] \quad (10)$$

These relations are expressed graphically in Figures 2(b) and 2(c). No surprises here: the graph of the first derivative matches Table 1 while the second derivative is akin to $-\frac{dF(t)}{dt}$, signifying the underlying systematic resistance to any ideological movement.
The results of Figures 1 and 2 are summarized below. The continuous functions \( F(t) \), \( \frac{d^2F(t)}{dt^2} \), and \( \frac{dF(t)}{dt} \) have been transformed into discrete functions at \( t = \{23, 24, 25, ..., 72\} \), or the relevant years 1955-2003.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>( F(t) )</th>
<th>( \frac{dF(t)}{dt} )</th>
<th>( \frac{d^2F(t)}{dt^2} )</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Spending</th>
<th>Executive orders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>0.6609</td>
<td>-0.00552918</td>
<td>-0.0030416</td>
<td>1.085271318</td>
<td>14.14392</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>0.65883</td>
<td>-0.00357782</td>
<td>-0.00284784</td>
<td>1.744186047</td>
<td>13.00366</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>0.65376</td>
<td>-0.002929756</td>
<td>-0.002750874</td>
<td>3.614457831</td>
<td>8.982036</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>0.64577</td>
<td>-0.008433495</td>
<td>-0.00258074</td>
<td>1.000000000</td>
<td>16.36953</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>0.63492</td>
<td>-0.01223402</td>
<td>-0.002640722</td>
<td>4.667609618</td>
<td>5.431755</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>0.62133</td>
<td>-0.014930567</td>
<td>-0.002519315</td>
<td>3.108108108</td>
<td>9.114927</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0.6051</td>
<td>-0.017509712</td>
<td>-0.002519315</td>
<td>3.108108108</td>
<td>9.114927</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0.58636</td>
<td>-0.019958833</td>
<td>-0.00238682</td>
<td>5.635648755</td>
<td>8.232446</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>0.56523</td>
<td>-0.022266175</td>
<td>-0.00250588</td>
<td>4.218362283</td>
<td>7.04698</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>0.54187</td>
<td>-0.024420913</td>
<td>-0.002107125</td>
<td>8.333333333</td>
<td>9.26855</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>0.51644</td>
<td>-0.026413197</td>
<td>-0.00196005</td>
<td>1.56062425</td>
<td>7.414494</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>0.48911</td>
<td>-0.028234213</td>
<td>-0.001811062</td>
<td>5.437352246</td>
<td>11.06195</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>0.46004</td>
<td>-0.029876215</td>
<td>-0.001661712</td>
<td>3.587443946</td>
<td>11.95219</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>0.42942</td>
<td>-0.031332571</td>
<td>-0.001513379</td>
<td>2.705627706</td>
<td>13.45196</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>0.39743</td>
<td>-0.032597788</td>
<td>-0.001367248</td>
<td>-1.159114858</td>
<td>9.598494</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.36428</td>
<td>-0.033667535</td>
<td>-0.001224295</td>
<td>2.452025586</td>
<td>13.10819</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0.33016</td>
<td>-0.034538661</td>
<td>-0.001085285</td>
<td>0.416233091</td>
<td>14.87854</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.29527</td>
<td>-0.035209203</td>
<td>-0.00095076</td>
<td>1.554404145</td>
<td>12.42291</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0.25981</td>
<td>-0.03567839</td>
<td>-0.00082105</td>
<td>2.142857143</td>
<td>10.03135</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0.22398</td>
<td>-0.035946632</td>
<td>-0.000696279</td>
<td>3.896103896</td>
<td>12.85613</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0.18799</td>
<td>-0.036015511</td>
<td>-0.000576378</td>
<td>3.461538462</td>
<td>23.63522</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0.15202</td>
<td>-0.035887757</td>
<td>-0.000461108</td>
<td>3.624535316</td>
<td>13.57836</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0.11628</td>
<td>-0.035627227</td>
<td>-0.00035008</td>
<td>2.331838565</td>
<td>10.44944</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>0.08095</td>
<td>-0.035058863</td>
<td>-0.000242786</td>
<td>4.031552178</td>
<td>11.21058</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.04622</td>
<td>-0.034366857</td>
<td>-0.000138627</td>
<td>-2.190395956</td>
<td>10.11709</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.01227</td>
<td>-0.033503599</td>
<td>-0.0000369444</td>
<td>0.000000000</td>
<td>15.38462</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-0.0207</td>
<td>-0.032471628</td>
<td>-0.000629421</td>
<td>-3.445305771</td>
<td>13.54932</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-0.0526</td>
<td>-0.031281572</td>
<td>0.000161705</td>
<td>-3.479036574</td>
<td>9.59929</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>-0.0832</td>
<td>-0.029943081</td>
<td>0.000259974</td>
<td>0.924214148</td>
<td>7.844498</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>-0.1125</td>
<td>-0.028466562</td>
<td>0.000358304</td>
<td>-0.366300366</td>
<td>5.20304</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>-0.1401</td>
<td>-0.026863106</td>
<td>0.000457148</td>
<td>1.562500000</td>
<td>10.64654</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Theory Explained

Thus far we have examined the scope of ideological change and modeled its behavior. What, though, constitutes the explanation for this behavior? Kelley (1976, 558) cautions that “[t]here is, of course, much intermixture and overlapping between the two parties” involved in a rivalry, perhaps rendering any interpretation hopeless. Gerring (1998, 256-275) makes an attempt nonetheless, categorizing potential explanations into four competing groups: classical, which portrays politics as “a battle between the rabble-rousers and the better sort”; social-class, which posits a struggle between “business enterprise” and “agrarian principles”; and realignment, with which we are already familiar.

With the realignment interpretation discredited, and the three alternatives unsatisfactory due to their vagueness, we shall attempt a novel explanation. A distinction between two rival ideological interest groups that alternate in power will be taken as a given, whether those interests be liberal versus conservative (the case in question), corporate versus agrarian, public versus private, left handed versus right handed, or whatever the preference of the reader. As the mechanism for implementing each interest group’s ideological agenda, the government may be viewed as supplying a greater quantity of goods associated with the group dominant at the moment. Since
public demand for these goods changes less rapidly (individuals generally maintain that their ideological preferences and generational change is a slow process, whereas a new government can be elected almost instantaneously), surpluses or shortages will often arise when the system is in disequilibrium (Fisher 1999, 25-50), providing the necessary impetus for ideological change.

**Supply**

This abstraction may be quantified by regressing $F(t)$ on the three dependent variables of Table 2. The resulting equation will serve as a supply curve, in which the dependent variables represent the quantity of supply (in this case, the change in federal employees, change in spending, and number of executive orders together approximate the extent of governmental involvement in supplying goods related to a liberal ideology) and $F(t)$ the “price” of supplying those goods (in this case, a higher value of $F(t)$ represents a higher price, since increasing the scale of government cannot help but lead to less oversight and more waste per unit of taxes received). Since “quantity” is of course an arbitrary figure, there is little need to perform complex statistical analysis; a simple second-degree polynomial regression should suffice.

We can now clarify Equation (5). Quantity of supply $Q_s$ constitutes an equal weighting of the three dependent variables, with the number of executive orders multiplied by one-tenth to maintain roughly equal magnitudes. 1975 is an outlier and therefore excluded. Resolving the coefficients, the final equation is then:

$$F(t) = -.6308 + .2574Q_s - .0128Q_s^2 + \epsilon$$

(11)

The curve naturally has a positive slope, for the supply of goods associated with high values of $F(t)$ is directly proportional to $F(t)$ itself. The regression’s high error mainly derives from the clustering of data points into two distinct groups, one for each cycle. Ordinarily the clusters would be isolated into separate regressions, but in this case such a measure would inappropriately limit equations (5) and (11) to only one of the cycles and thus fail to explain the transition periods which concern us. Accordingly, the weaker yet more useful equation will be used.

**Demand**

Completing this microeconomic model will require a demand curve. The demand for the goods in question may be measured through public opinion, in particular public attitudes concerning the desired scope of government. This is a vague subject, and consequently lacks many detailed studies. Many surveys have indeed been conducted, however, on public opinion towards taxation. A greater public willingness to pay taxes would presumably translate into a greater desire for government services, and hence a greater quantity of demand for
goods associated with high values of $F(t)$. Of course this is a crude indicator – Stimson (1991) has constructed a much more complex set of measures. For the sake of clarity, only public willingness to pay taxes shall be used as the variable most closely related to demand. As noted above, such attitudes are partially dependent on the “price” of supplying those goods – if taxes are squandered or otherwise allocated inefficiently, as is the case for larger governments, we would expect a lower quantity of demand (King and Stivers 1998, 16). Conversely, low values of $F(t)$ will tend to increase the quantity of demand, as evidenced by liberal trends in public opinion over the period 1928-1936 (Erikson and Tedin 1981).

Figure 3 expresses the public willingness to pay taxes, as measured (Bowman 2004, 5-6) by the proportion of respondents who characterized their tax burden as “about right” divided by the proportion regarding it as “too high,” multiplied by three to maintain a similar magnitude to $Q_d$. (Responses of “too low” are negligible.)

Public willingness to pay taxes exhibits a marked decline throughout the second half of the liberal cycle and then an uptick upon the start of the conservative cycle, in line with expectations deriving from the price $F(t)$. Some of this change is surely due to the straightforward reductions in taxes during the early 1980s, but since no such rise in demand is evident following the comparable 1963 tax cut, we may safely assume that much of the change derives from price fluctuations. In other words, a negative feedback cycle exists in which greater demand (willingness to pay taxes) leads to a greater supply (provision of government services), which increases the price (government profligacy lowering the effectiveness of tax revenues), thus serving to lower demand.

Quantifying this model necessitates the construction of a demand curve to accompany the supply curve of equation (11). The public willingness to pay taxes appears to be most strongly correlated with $\int F(t)$, or the cumulative effect of a particular cycle, due to ideological stagnation leading to a less efficient government and collective public fatigue. $\int F(t)$ is very difficult to compute, but the same effect may be achieved by differentiating both sides of the relation; then, $F(t)$ is negatively correlated with the change in public willingness to pay taxes, henceforth regarded as the quantity of demand. This is a key difference with Stimson’s and related models, which emphasize absolute values rather than their derivatives as the key indicators. A similar regression will be performed on this variable.

We can now clarify Equation (6). 1949, 1952, and 1957 are outliers and therefore excluded. Resolving the coefficients gives the final equation:

$$F(t) = .5495 - .2792Q_d + .0167Q_d^2 + \varepsilon$$

(12)
Once more the regression proves weak due to the clustering of data points into two groups based upon each cycle, and once more little can be done while preserving the equation’s usefulness. As expected, the slope is negative, so we now have a complete system (Figure 4). We can now clarify Equation (7) to produce at long last a completed model of cyclical ideological change.

\[
-0.6308 \cdot 0.2574 \cdot Q_s - 0.0128 \cdot Q_r^2 \approx e^{-0.0056} \sin(0.0363 \cdot t^{1.5}) \approx 0.5495 - 0.2792Q_d + 0.0167Q_d^2 + e \quad (13)
\]

The intersection of the supply and demand curves should be located at \( F(t) = 0 \), signifying equilibrium; this discrepancy may be attributed to the error terms of equations (11) through (13).

**Disequilibrium**

The validity of this system may be verified by examining the historical record. In 1932, \( F(t) \approx 0 \) so \( Q_s \approx Q_d \) was an apparent equilibrium. Yet as we saw earlier, a rising tide of liberalism led \( \frac{dF(t)}{dt} > 0 \). This placed upward pressure on the price \( F(t) \) (Table 2), also increasing \( Q_s \) and decreasing \( Q_d \). Since markets clear on their supply curves, \( Q_s - Q_d \) units of excess supply were created. By the late 1950s, \( F(t) \approx 0.66 \), \( Q_s \approx 9 \), and \( Q_d \approx 0 \), a surplus of about nine units (Figure 5(a)).

Since quantity of supply exceeded quantity of demand, the price \( F(t) \) fell. As mentioned earlier, much of the mechanism of this reversal stemmed from the backlash engendered by the second ideological government’s misguided attempt to push \( F(t) \) still higher. By 1980, \( F(t) \approx 0 \) so \( Q_s \approx Q_d \), and equilibrium had seemingly been restored. The momentum of a negative \( \frac{dF(t)}{dt} \) value continued to lower the price, leading to an “overshoot” and a shortfall of \( Q_d - Q_s \) units. By the late 1990s, \( F(t) \approx -0.32 \), \( Q_s \approx 1.28 \), and \( Q_d \approx 4.15 \), reaching a shortfall of about three units (Figure 5(b)).

**Projections**

At this juncture, we have modeled ideological change from 1932 to the present and constructed an economic explanation. The obvious next step is to use these findings to make projections of future ideological change.

We may expect the shortfall of Figure 5(b) to be remedied through a rising price \( F(t) \), confirmed by equation (8). That equation projects \( F(t) \)
returning to zero in 2020, when \( Q_s \approx Q_d \) (Figure 5(c)). The mechanisms for this shift – involving a rise in \( Q_s \) of about one unit and a fall in \( Q_d \) of about two units – deserve a detailed interpretation. We will pick up where we left off, at the second ideological government.

**Second ideological government**

This government provides much of the mechanism for the rise in \( F(t) \). Its attempt to decrease \( F(t) \) has largely failed and given rise to a backlash. The ensuing low quantity of supply relative to demand cannot help but to drive up the price, or \( F(t) \). Accordingly, while \( F(t) \) is solidly in negative territory, \( \frac{dF(t)}{dt} \) is positive and still growing (Table 2).

In practical terms, the next four years would represent the final era of unrestrained conservatism. Their considerable prosperity will translate into high administration popularity notwithstanding foreign policy concerns, as evidenced by the 2004 election results, and assisting its ideological goals of tax and entitlement reform to provide a domestic counterpoint for the foreign policy emphasis of the first term. However, these short-term gains will have come at the long-term cost of sowing the seeds for positive ideological change later on.

**Second moderate opposition government**

This change may appear to assume the form of the second moderate opposition government, narrowly elected in 2008. On second thought, perhaps not; strong conservative control of Congress and the judiciary will force this government to adopt more moderate policies than it had planned during its campaign. But first impressions were correct after all - as seen in Figure 5(c), this administration does preside over a marked rise in \( F(t) \), despite its moderation and slowly waning popularity attendant to the economic slump of the 2010s. Through judicial appointments and selective vetoes, if not initiatives, it also provides much of the mechanism for the positive ideological change.

Despite the government’s general competency, a faltering economy will complicate its 2012 re-election bid. As with its counterpart during the liberal cycle, it may attempt to compensate by adopting highly stimulatory monetary and fiscal policies (Johnson 887-890), including tax cuts or rebates. It may also launch new diplomatic initiatives to compensate for domestic weaknesses through foreign policy success, perhaps reaching out to Europe or China to assume more of the burden in combating terrorism, as did its counterpart during the liberal cycle with the Cold War. The government will accordingly coast to re-election, but at the price of a rocky second term. Rising interest rates due to the pre-election stimulus will deal the economy a blow from which the government’s popularity cannot recover.
**Third ideological government**

By 2016, the electorate will incline towards change. After the apparently rocky tenure of an opposition government, it returns to the known quantity of forthrightly ideological leadership. Yet lacking any clear ideas of how to remedy the national decline, this government will fare no better than its predecessor. The weak economy will continue, concomitantly weakening national influence over global events, and leading the administration to suffer through a series of foreign policy reversals.\(^{17}\) With \(F(t)\) the one indicator that seems to be on the rise, the government in its final years will panic and turn to moderation. Measures born of desperation rarely bear fruit, and the fate of its counterpart during the liberal cycle indicates that this government is no exception.

**A new cycle**

The shortfall of Figure 5(c) is therefore remedied by 2020. Projections beyond that year, however, are a delicate business. While the termination of the current cycle is evident, the nature of its successor is not. Perhaps the best place to begin is through a continuation of Figure 2.

The increase in \(F(t)\) over the interval 2005-2020 is expected and already explained. Figure 6 also indicates a continuation of the increase until 2037 (in line with Figure 5(c)), presumably the apex of the next ideological cycle. While the precise form of this cycle is unclear, the evidence accumulated thus far can establish its general contours.

An increase in \(F(t)\) parallels the 1932 scenario of a generally liberal cycle, only with a lower magnitude. This stands to reason, for an aging population and the residual effects of the conservative cycle would severely constrain any attempt by a 2020s ideological government to increase spending. In order to maintain a rising ratio of \(Q_s\) relative to \(Q_d\), then, the quantity of demand would have to fall significantly, due to the lower efficiency resulting from higher taxes to support a larger government. The late 2030s show projected values of \(F(t) \approx 0.17\), \(Q_s \approx 3.8\), and \(Q_d \approx 1.5\), for a surplus of about two units (Figure 5(c)). If past cases are any indication, after a moderate interlude a second ideological government will attempt to push \(F(t)\) higher, creating a backlash that in fact contributes to a steady decline in \(F(t)\). The 2050s would see ideological

---

\(^{17}\) China, in particular, will gain power relative to the U.S. throughout the 2010s, comprising the source of many of these setbacks. Its rapidly aging demographics during the 2020s due in part to a low mean fertility rate of 1.5 over the 1995-2010 period (Ogawa 1989, 27) would reverse this trend, consistent with a projected American revival during that time period as the result of a new ideological cycle.
stagnation and moderate governance, such that by the end of that decade $F(t)$ will have fallen to zero and $Q_s \approx Q_d$ (Figure 7(a)).

The last cycle

Out of momentum $\frac{dF(t)}{dt}$ is still negative (Figure 6), so $F(t)$ declines into negative territory and a new cycle begins. Much as the liberal cycle was characterized by spending increases, and the conservative cycle by tax cuts, so will this cycle be characterized by spending cuts. The ideological government that assumes power in the late 2060s would probably be generally libertarian in orientation, committed to mitigating the fiscal excesses of prior cycles while retaining a socially benign image. $Q_s$ will accordingly fall, while $Q_d$ rises somewhat to account for a greater public willingness to pay taxes in the face of streamlined governance. By the mid 2070s $F(t) \approx -0.09$, $Q_s \approx 2.4$, and $Q_d \approx 2.7$: while the shortfall is at its greatest – about a third of a unit – it is small indeed when compared to that of previous cycles (Figure 7(a)). The ensuing backlash will be minor, for the system is nearly at equilibrium already. Nevertheless, the shortfall cannot help but place upward pressure on $F(t)$, confirmed by Figure 6 and illustrated in Figure 7(b).

Stability?

By the 2090s $F(t)$ will have risen once more to equilibrium level. Ordinarily one would now predict the commencement of another cycle, for $\frac{dF(t)}{dt}$ remains positive (Figure 6). However, the ideology function’s magnitude is so slight as to suggest the absence of any additional cycles, and hence of any further significant ideological change. While in theory oscillations linger forever, in practice they eventually come to an end, and the 2090s seem a natural stopping point.

Such ideological stability is not inconsistent with the maintenance of a democratic system of governance. While social science would presumably have advanced to the point that an optimal set of public policies is generally known, the two parties could still stake opposing claims as to the optimal means of implementation. Despite “the great age and durability of the party system and the ideologies to which it gives expression” (Kelley 1976, 558), only the former may remain, and even then within the context of “an increasingly postparty era in which, while the parties continue to perform certain functions in the political world, their reach, importance, and acceptance have sunk to levels unknown for almost two centuries” (Silbey 2002, 2). While perhaps detrimental to the party system, and certainly so for the employment prospects of future observers of politics, this stability would constitute a positive development insofar as it
avoids the disruptions inherent in ideological change. Similar stability within the economic and international systems would signal a true end to history.

**Daniel Barclay**, an MIT student, hopes to continue these efforts in positive political economy insofar as they do not detract from gainful employment. He wrote this article independently during the summer and fall of 2004.

(a) Annual percentage change in federal non-defense employees

(b) Annual percentage change in federal, state, and municipal non-defense expenditures

(c) Annual number of executive orders issued

(a) The ideology function

(b) Derivative

(c) Second derivative

FIGURE 4. Ideological supply and demand curves.
FIGURE 5. Path of market clearance, 1932-2037.

The ideology function

Derivative

Second derivative
FIGURE 7. Projected path of market clearance, 2037-2093. (a) (b)
References


